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1. INTRODUCTION 
The contracting explanation of conservatism suggests that accounting is a means of 
addressing information asymmetry amongst the various parties to the firm. In practice, 
accounting conservatism defers reported earnings and understates net assets, thus 
constraining opportunistic wealth transfers by management at the expense of other 
parties (Watts, 2003). Recent accounting research (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2001; 
Ball, Kothari and Wu, 2003; Raonic, McLeay and Asimakopoulos, 2004; Bushman, 
Chen, Engel and Smith, 2004; Huijgen and Lubberink,2005; Lara, Osma and Mora, 
2005;Bushman and Piotroski, 2006) has shed light on the interaction between 
accounting conservatism and various institutional factors that contribute to the 
resolution of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. The present 
study considers this asymmetry as conditional on the ownership structure of firms, 
and examines the influence of legal arrangements for investor protection and 
corporate governance monitoring mechanisms on accounting conservatism. We 
evaluate this not only by means of the association between current news and current 
earnings, but also with respect to the association between the same news and future 
earnings in order to assess its persistence. 
Most previous international accounting research in this area has examined firm 
level accounting behaviour using country level explanatory variables, which either 
characterise national institutions or measure typical behaviour in each of the countries 
involved. For example, the variables introduced by LaPorta et al. (1998) that are 
employed in an assessment of international differences in earnings management by 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) include, amongst others, types of legal system and 
indicators of the degree of legal enforcement in each jurisdiction. Other variables are 
also employed, such as total stock market capitalisation and median share ownership 
concentration, which aggregate or summarise at the country level economic activities 
that takes place at the firm level. In contrast, the present paper does not rely on 
aggregate level analysis in this way, but extends the model to include the appropriate 
effects at the firm level. This is because the determinants of information asymmetry, 
such as ownership structure, vary cross-sectionally both within and between countries. 
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In addition to the above, previous international research has considered a set of 
institutional variables that were designed primarily to address the principal-agent 
problem in economies with widespread corporate ownership. This disregards the 
possibility that jurisdictions where concentrated ownership is dominant might have 
developed alternative mechanisms, such as corporate governance monitoring 
provisions, in order to deal with the particular nature of the information asymmetries 
in place. Thus, in this study, the institutional arrangements that are modelled include 
not only legal provisions for the protection of minority shareholders, such as the anti-
director rights described by LaPorta et al. (1998), but also the monitoring provisions 
that are set down in codes of corporate governance. Accordingly, this paper examines 
whether these mechanisms are substitutes, conditional on the nature of the 
information asymmetry that is entailed by ownership concentration. 
The third contribution of the present study is to examine conservatism in a 
multi-period setting, building on the rationalisation of analyst forecasting in Helbok 
and Walker (2004). Most research in this area has focused on the contemporaneous 
asymmetric recognition of bad news with regards to good news. Whilst this approach 
provides a basis for analysing the relation between current period earnings and value 
shocks, it sheds no light on whether the observed relation is expected to persist. This 
feature of accounting conservatism is of particular interest. As Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) argue, opportunistic managers not only avoid recognising the full extent of bad 
news in current earnings but also attempt to delay such recognition within their 
tenure. The extent to which such behaviour is enabled by the ownership structure of 
the firm and the institutional arrangements that govern it can only be tested 
empirically within a multi-period setting by associating current returns with current 
estimates of future earnings. 
Rather than extracting expectations from subsequently reported earnings, we 
base the present study upon the observable earnings forecasts that are produced by 
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analysts.1 Given that analysts try to predict the earnings figure that will be reported by 
the firm, it follows that accounting conservatism will be an inherent feature of the way 
in which such forecasts are updated. If, during the year, analysts update their forecasts 
of current earnings to incorporate new information, then it is likely that positive share 
price shocks will have less impact on the forecast of current earnings than negative 
shocks, although this will reverse over the forecast horizon. Consistent with this view, 
Helbok and Walker (2004) find that current year earnings forecasts that are produced 
at the time of the announcement of previous year earnings are likely to be unbiased 
when news during the current fiscal year is positive, and optimistic when the news 
during the year is negative. This implies that analysts construct their forecasts by 
allowing for conservatism and its eventual reversal, and it is this property of earnings 
forecasts that is evaluated here.2 
2. CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, INVESTOR PROTECTION AND 
CONSERVATISM 
Shareholders are residual claimants on the income stream generated by companies and 
thus are more exposed either to the diversion of corporate resources or to decisions 
that are not value-maximizing.3 International studies on the value relevance of 
                                                 
 
 
1 Previously, Collins, Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1994) have employed future reported earnings 
(orthogonalised with respect to future value shocks) in order to proxy for earnings expectations, 
although not in the context of the asymmetric recognition of bad and good news. Recent research 
suggests that forecasts of the current year’s earnings that are produced around the fiscal year end are 
unbiased (Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki, 2004). 
2 Other research suggests a behavioural explanation for bias in analysts’ forecasts, i.e. analysts have 
incentives to be optimistically biased which may be attributed to their business environment. However, 
Irvine (2004) finds that the forecast error does not boost trading volume of brokerage houses whilst 
optimistic recommendations do. Lin and McNichols (1998) also find no evidence that earnings 
forecasts by affiliated analysts for current and one year ahead earnings exhibit greater optimism than 
forecasts by unaffiliated analysts (where the term affiliated refers to analysts employed by a brokerage 
house that provides investment banking services to the firm, or has done so in the recent past). 
3 Lombardo and Pagano (2002) include nepotistic appointments, the pursuit of unprofitable “pet” 
projects, and low managerial effort amongst such decisions. 
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financial statements (Hung, 2000) and the management of earnings (Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki, 2003) argue that accrual accounting gives managers the opportunity to mask 
the firm’s economic performance, which may be put into effect by overstating 
reported earnings in order to conceal unfavourable circumstances, or by understating 
reported earnings in order to create reserves that will cushion negative shocks in 
future periods. Investor protection mechanisms address these concerns by enabling 
shareholders to hold managers accountable for their actions. Such mechanisms are 
consistent with conservative accounting, not only by forcing managers to 
communicate economic losses fully and in a timely manner by incorporating them in 
current earnings, but also by preventing them from deferring loss recognition to future 
periods and thereby shifting the consequences onto subsequent generations of 
managers (Watts 2003). The empirical findings of these studies imply also that, in 
weaker investor protection regimes, managers are less likely to face penalties if they 
behave opportunistically when making operating and financial reporting choices, and 
that earnings are less conservative as a result.4 
In this paper, we argue that the relationship between investor protection and the 
financial reporting process, which impinges on the contract between shareholders and 
managers, is determined by the nature of information asymmetries at the firm level.5 
For example, in firms with widely held shares, most shareholders rely on the financial 
report to provide timely information about potential losses, therefore driving the 
demand for conservative accounting as a means of solving the information asymmetry 
between them and the managers of the firm. On the other hand, in firms with closely 
held shares, the interests of managers and the majority shareholders are more likely to 
be aligned. Since those with large shareholdings may take a more active role in 
                                                 
 
 
4 Beekes, Pope and Young (2004) have shown that conservative accounting is associated with the 
presence of independent executives on the boards of UK companies, evidence which points to the 
positive impact of governance mechanisms and not only investor protection legislation. 
5 In this study, the main focus is the contract between managers and shareholders. However, the 
contract between managers and debt holders, and possibly other stakeholders, also induces conservative 
accounting (Watts, 2003). Nevertheless, as debt-free firms are also subject to conservative accounting, 
the universal driver of accounting conservatism can be said to be the contract between shareholders and 
managers. 
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management, and have access to alternative (insider) sources of information, they will 
rely less on financial reporting in order to monitor managers. Thus, their demand for 
the timely recognition of economic losses is likely to be lower.6 However, in these 
closely held firms, whilst the information asymmetry between majority shareholders 
and managers is likely to be resolved, the asymmetry will now exist between the 
controlling parties (i.e., the managers and majority shareholders) and outsiders (i.e., 
minority shareholders). Here, we argue that the extent to which information 
asymmetry in firms with concentrated ownership is resolved through the financial 
reporting process depends on whether or not the rights of minority shareholders are 
protected by institutional arrangements. In jurisdictions where the interests of 
minority shareholders are strongly protected, either by close monitoring or through 
legal investor protection provisions, information asymmetries are addressed in the 
financial reporting processes by the timely recognition of losses, and hence the 
negative impact of ownership concentration on conservatism should be reduced. 
Therefore, this study emphasises that the magnitude of the effect on accounting 
behaviour of institutional arrangements at the country level is conditional upon 
corporate ownership structures at the firm level, suggesting that their interactive effect 
on accounting conservatism should be investigated. 
Two aspects of the institutional arrangements in place are analysed here. The 
first of these relates to the monitoring of managers’ actions by shareholders, based on 
the various supervisory structures documented in national corporate governance codes 
(European Corporate Governance Institute, 2001). The second category includes 
specific provisions in company legislation that empower shareholders and which have 
been detailed in prior research into law and finance (La Porta et al., 1998). Table 1 
provides a summary across the countries of the variables involved in the study. 
                                                 
 
 
6 A similar argument would apply to the comparison between listed and nonlisted firms, the latter 
tending to concentrated ownership. Evidence of less conservatism in private firms is reported by Ball 
and Shivarakumar (2004) and Peek, Buijink and Coppens (2004). 
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With regard to the monitoring of managers by shareholders, we focus on the 
structuring of the board of directors. A major difference among European countries 
relates to the use of a unitary versus a two-tier board. The unitary board structure is 
predominant in many countries, although in Belgium, Finland and France two-tier 
boards are also present and, in Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, the two-tier 
structure is predominant. Generally, both the unitary board of directors and the 
supervisory body in the two-tier structure are elected by shareholders. Under both 
types of system, there is usually a supervisory function and a managerial function, 
although this distinction is more formalised in the two-tier structure. The unitary 
board and the supervisory body in the two-tier system usually appoint the members of 
the managerial body (either the management board in the two-tier system or a group 
of managers to whom the unitary board delegates authority in the unitary system), and 
they also have responsibility for ensuring that financial reporting and control systems 
are functioning properly. However, in two-tier systems, there is a more pronounced 
distinction between the role of the supervisory body and that of the managerial body. 
As we anticipate that control over the behaviour of managers will be more effective 
when there is a clearer distinction between the ‘supervisor’ and those being 
‘supervised’, a score of 1 is assigned to a country with a predominant two-tier board 
structure. In addition, in countries such as Denmark, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, companies of a certain size and type must appoint a general 
manager. In such instances, there is a distinct separation between supervisory and 
managerial leadership, even within a unitary board (e.g. in Finland and Sweden), 
which should facilitate the monitoring of management by the supervisory body. 
Therefore, a country gets a score of 1 if there is such a requirement. As both variables 
described above capture the effect of corporate governance, we construct a summary 
indicator CG that scores 1 if at least one of the above is in place in a given country 
and 0 if none is in place. 
The second of the institutional arrangements examined in this study is the 
protection of investors’ rights within the law. In this context, if the law in a given 
country grants the right to minority shareholders to challenge the decisions of the 
management, or if it enables minority shareholders to call a meeting or place an item 
on the meeting agenda, or if it allows voting by mail, or proportional representation 
when appointing directors to the board, investor protection is considered to be 
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stronger. In such circumsatnces, a score of 1 is assigned to a particular country. As all 
four variables are indicators of the presence of mechanisms for the protection of 
outside investors, we construct a second summary indicator IP that scores 1 if at least 
one of the mechanisms is present in a given country and 0 if none is present. 
3. CURRENT NEWS IN ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS 
This section sets out the model employed in examining the incorporation of 
contemporaneous news into forward earnings. Following Pope and Walker (1999), 
permanent earnings for the current year are considered to be equal to permanent 
earnings at the beginning of the year 1−tx  plus a permanent shock te  that can be either 
positive or negative depending on the expectations of future cash flows suggested by 
the current set of information, i.e. 
1                                                            (1 )t t tx x e−= +  
Furthermore, the current year’s permanent earnings xt define the stock price when 
capitalised at an assumed constant discount rate r, as follows: 
)2(
r
xP tt =  
If reported earnings Xt were equal to permanent earnings, then xt is just replaced 
by Xt in equation (2). Due to accounting conservatism, however, the current year’s 
positive value shock is not likely to increase current reported earnings. Instead, the 
effect will appear gradually in future reported earnings at a pace that is suggested by 
the accounting principles that govern the calculation of reported earnings together 
with any managerial discretion that is exercised. In the case of bad news on the other 
hand, agency costs and information asymmetries are likely to lead to immediate, and 
even over-cautious, recognition. As a result, reported earnings can be represented as: 
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1 Θ Γt t t t t tX x e e e V− + −= + − + +                                        (3) 
where tX  is reported earnings at time t; 1tx −  is permanent earnings at time t-1; et is 
the shock to permanent earnings in period t; Θ is a parameter that captures the initial 
under-recognition of good news +te  in period t; Γ  reflects the initial over-recognition 
of bad news −te  in period t; and tV  represents the deferred effect of the gradual 
reversal of the conservative treatment of prior period shocks that, by assumption, are 
not correlated with current period shocks. 
Drawing upon earnings forecasts to assess the incorporation of current news in 
accounting earnings in a multiperiod setting, reported earnings are replaced in this 
study by the earnings forecast 
( )tFt n+  prepared at time (t) for the forward earnings 
period t+n (n=0,1,2,..). An appropriate model of earnings forecasts has been 
constructed by Helbok and Walker (2004), accounting for the influence of 
conservatism both in terms of the initial under- and over-recognition of news as well 
as the reversal of this bias in subsequent periods. The Helbok-Walker model is based 
on the assumption that analysts are aware of the conservative nature of accounting and 
understand the implications of conservatism for reported earnings; and second, that 
analysts’ forecasts are rational conditional expectations of reported earnings given the 
available information set at the time. 
Within this general framework, the Helbok-Walker model forecasts one year 
ahead earnings by incorporating the reversal of conservatism in two parts.7 The first of 
these relates to news in t-1, and comprises the fraction of the initial under-recognition 
of news in t-1 that is recognised in the following year when the shock to permanent 
                                                 
 
 
7 The model described here corresponds to Model 1 in Helbok and Walker (2004, Eq 11), which 
receives greater empirical support than the alternative proposal in their study. The reversal of 
conservatism in the year following the initial earnings shocks is denoted 1 10 0e et t− −
+ −−θ γ  in the Helbok-
Walker model.  
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earnings is positive, 1et tθ −+⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , or the reversal of the initial over-recognition when the 
shock is negative, 1et t−
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠γ . The second component of the Helbok-Walker reversal 
relates to changes between t-1 and t in the stock of conservatism that was triggered by 
news in all prior years ( Vt∆ ). Thus, the forecast of the earnings for the year t made at 
the end of year t-1 is defined as: 
( )1
1 1 1
t
F X e e Vt t t t t tt
−
− − −+ −⎛ ⎞= + − + ∆⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠θ γ                                             (4) 
Taking account of the way in which analysts prepare their earnings forecasts, 
that is by allowing for the over- and under-recognition of news in earnings, it now 
follows from (3) that the last forecast to be made at the end of year t but before the 
earnings for the year t are disclosed, denoted )(ttF , is as follows: 
1
( ) Θ Γt
tF x e e e Vt t t tt −
+ −= + − + +                                                  (5) 
Likewise, the forecast of next year’s earnings that is prepared at the end of the current 
year 
( )
1
t
Ft+ will be defined as:  
( )
1 1 11
( )t tF F e e Vt t t t tt t + + ++
+ −⎛ ⎞= + − + ∆⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠θ γ                                     (6) 
In the present study, it is further assumed that, in a multiperiod setting, the 
proportion Θ of current good news +te that has not been captured initally by the 
current year forecast )(ttF  is likely to be recognised gradually in forecast earnings for 
future periods, i.e. in 
( )tFt n+ , where n ≥ 1. If θt+n is the fraction of +te  that is expected to 
be recognised in each of the years until t+m, where n=1,2,…m, then, in the long term, 
the accumulation of reversals 
1
m
t n t
n
eθ ++
=
∑  would offset the original under-recognition 
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et
+Θ  as 
1
m
n
t ne et t−+
=
+ +Θ∑θ  tends to zero. Negative shocks, however, tend to be either 
fully recognised, or even over-recognised if managers are unduly cautious. In the case 
of over-recognition, the initial bias et−Γ  is likely to be corrected by means of the 
reversal term 
1
m
t n t
n
eγ −+
=
∑  in the near future such that 
1
m
n
t ne et t− +
=
− −Γ ∑γ  tends to zero. 
It should be noted that it is not only current shocks that determine earnings 
expectations, and therefore we add a further component ∆Vt+n which denotes future 
reversals relating to the recognition of past shocks. 8 By extending the Helbok-Walker 
model in this respect to more than one year ahead, forecast earnings can be described 
as follows:9 
( )
1 1
( )
m m
t
t n t nt n
n n
tF F e e Vt t t nt ++ + +
= =
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+ −= + − + ∆⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑θ γ                            (7) 
Whereas )(ttF incorporates the initial under- and over-recognition of current 
permanent earnings shocks, as shown in (5), 
( )tFt n+  in (7) accomodates the gradual 
recognition of positive shocks by adding the term 
1
t n
m
et
n
+ +θ
=
∑ and the correction of the 
initial overecognition of negative shocks by substracting the term 
1
m
t n
n
etγ +
=
−∑ . 
                                                 
 
 
8 For instance, Pope and Walker (1999) and Ryan and Zarowin (2003) provide evidence that curent 
earnings are associated with prior price changes dating back at least three years. 
9 The expected earnings process described here implies a full payout dividend policy, where earnings 
expectations are comparable to permanent earnings in the Hicksian sense. However, earnings forecasts 
will normally be drawn up on the assumption of a dividend payout of less than 100%. In this case, the 
earnings forecast also includes a component arising from the reinvestment of prior earnings. This does 
not affect the inferences drawn as the reinvestment yield does not induce shocks in permanent earnings. 
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RESEARH DESIGN 
Incorporation of good and bad news in earnings expectations 
If the model described above were fitted as a regression, the dependent variable would 
be the earnings forecast either for the current year or a future year and the explanatory 
variables would be present and past value shocks. Since we shall consider the effects 
of accounting conservatism within a three year interval, an expansion of the window 
beyond three years in order to allow for past price changes is not expected to 
contribute substantially to the evidence on conservatism reversal. Indeed, Collins et 
al. (1992) argue that economic events typically cause investors to revise their 
expectations of earnings over a relatively short horizon, with only modest revisions 
beyond that point. Moreover, they find little benefit from adding the fourth year’s 
earnings growth rate in a test of association of current returns and future earnings. 
Thus, the regression model employed in the present study examines the association 
between earnings forecasts for three years and the current value shock, as follows: 
                                              (8) 
where FYi,t+n is the expected earnings of the ith firm either for the current year (n=0), 
or for one year ahead (n=1), or two years ahead (n=2), scaled by market capitalisation 
at the beginning of the current year; and Rit is the annual change in market 
capitalisation of the ith firm deflated by the market capitalisation at the beginning of 
the current year, 
1
1
−
−−
t
tt
MC
MCMC
. 
Separate regressions are fitted for positive and negative market capitalisation 
changes and for each n.10 For positive R, the slope coefficient 1α  in (8) will increase 
                                                 
 
 
10 Dietrich, Muller and Riedl (2003) point out that the inclusion of a dummy variable to compare the 
effect of good and bad news, which is commonplace in earnings conservatism studies, introduces a bias 
in the error.  
0 1 20 1FY α α R u , n , ,i,t n it it= + + =+
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with n, consistent with the positive sign of 
1
m
t n
n
θ et+
=
+∑  in (7), reflecting the influence of 
good news that is revealed gradually and cumulatively. On the other hand, in the case 
of negative returns, the coefficient 1α  is expected to decrease, consistent with the 
negative sign of 
1
m
t n
n
etγ +
=
−∑  in (7), and to do so at a faster rate, reflecting the transitory 
character of bad news over-recognition in a going concern firm. 
Interaction effects 
The full model describes the effect on conservatism of the presence within the 
jurisdiction where the firm is domiciled of strong investor protection mechanisms 
and/or a governance structure that separates monitoring from management, 
conditional upon the ownership of the firm. Thus, the full model must allow for the 
interaction of such institutional effects at the country level with a measure of 
ownership structure at the firm level. The specification of these variables is discussed 
below. 
First, in order to model the institutional arrangements described in this study, 
we employ a factorial design where the coding scheme k specifies four levels, as 
follows:- (k=1,1) if the firm operates in an environment where strong investor 
protection is imposed by law and where managerial monitoring is also provided for in 
the local corporate governance code; (k=1,0) if there is strong investor protection but 
no monitoring; (k=0,1) if there is monitoring but investor protection is weak; and 
(k=0,0) if neither is adequate. In this way, accounting conservatism under these 
different combinations of investor protection and corporate governance is described 
by the interaction of the factor IPCGk and the scaled value shocks Rit. That is, from 
(8), we have 
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2
i ,t n it k k k k it it
FY R IPCG IPCG R u , n , ,
+
= α + α + α + α ∗ + =                    (9) 
Note that IPCGk = 0,0 is considered here as the reference group, with all effects that 
are attributable to the presence of either strong investor protection or clearly defined 
monitoring provisions being incremental thereto.11 
Second, as previous studies provide evidence that ownership concentration is 
related to investor protection and board characteristics (see Denis and Sarin, 1999; 
and La Porta et al., 1998, 1999), and as these are the proposed independent variables 
in our own research design, it should be recognised that ownership concentration is 
likely to be determined in part by the institutional arrangements surrounding the firm, 
and, therefore, is most probably partially endogenous.12 In order to eliminate any 
endogenous bias from the right-hand side variables, we employ an approach similar to 
that in Denis and Sarin (1999), that is a two-stage procedure where in the first stage 
ownership is orthogonalized with respect both to IPCGk and to the size effect proxied 
by market capitalization (MCit). The orthogonalized value of ownership is then 
included as a separate independent variable in the second stage regression, as follows: 
0 1 2it k k it it
O C IPC G M Cβ β β ε= + + +                             (10) 
The residual term in (10) is the component of OC  that is not determined by the 
combinations of institutional arrangements IPCGk and is therefore exogenous to the 
second stage interactions model. Defining the exogenous ownership effects as CO ′  = 
itε , the extension of (10) to incorporate the ownership effect leads to: 
                                                 
 
 
11 In a generalised linear model, IPCGk may be incorporated as a single factor with four nominal levels, 
which is the convention adopted here, or as two interacting factors IP and CG with two levels each. 
Alternatively, in an ordinary least squares regression, each of the four levels could be represented by a 
dummy variable. 
12 Denis and Sarin (1999) provide evidence that firms can exhibit significant changes in ownership and 
board structure in any given year and that these changes are correlated with one another representing 
discrete shifts in ownership structure and board composition. The evidence from La Porta et al. (1998, 
1999) demonstrates that, in countries with poor anti-director protection, shareholders need to own more 
capital to be able to exercise their rights. 
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0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7
i ,t n it k k k k it it it
k k it k k it it it it
FY R IPCG IPCG R R OC
IPCG OC IPCG R OC MC u
+
′= α + α + α + α ∗ + α ∗
′ ′+ α ∗ + α ∗ ∗ + α +           (11) 
The coefficients α0 to α3 describe the institutional effects on firms that are 
widely held. With respect to accounting conservatism, α1 captures the timeliness of 
earnings when there is no close holding of shares, weak investor protection and no 
governance requirements for separate monitoring, and α3k describes the incremental 
effect on timeliness of either stronger investor protection, or clearly defined 
monitoring mechanisms, or both. The intercept α0 + α2k predicts expected earnings 
under each of the IPCGk combinations (0,0; 1,0; 0,1; 1,1) when the value shock is 
zero. As a wide shareholder base is expected to increase demand for timely 
information, it follows that institutional arrangements are likely to be less influential 
in this respect, which implies insignificant α3k coefficients. Such a finding would have 
notable implications for the interpretation of prior evidence of more pronounced 
conservatism in countries where the investor base is more widespread (e.g. the US and 
UK), as this would show that conservative accounting is driven by the demand created 
by shareholders rather than by regulatory devices. 
The coefficients α4 to α6 model the interactions between increasing ownership 
concentration and the institutional environment described above, and the magnitude of 
these coefficients indicates how the nature of information asymmetry varies with 
insider involvement. A negative sign on α4 would suggest that, when investor 
protection is weak and corporate governance does not separate supervision from 
management, the more closely held the firm’s ownership, the more managers are 
likely to defer the recognition of bad news to the future. To the extent that corporate 
laws or governance codes prove to be effective in preventing aggressive reporting by 
managers when the economic performance of the firm is weak, this will be reflected 
in a postive interaction effect α6k that offsets the adverse effects of insider control 
captured in the negative sign of α4. Furthermore, the delay in reporting economic 
underperformance should also manifest itself in a negative α4 that persists across the 
forecast horizon, whilst the institutional pressure to counteract such behaviour should 
be reflected in positive α6k across the horizon. 
On the other hand, there are no strong arguments with respect to the effects of 
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investor protection, corporate governance and ownership structure on the timeliness of 
earnings in the presence of positive value shocks, as accounting conservatism 
contends with wealth decreases rather than wealth increases. As mentioned earlier, the 
recognition of positive shocks is expected to be less pronounced, but there is no 
reason why such recognition should vary in accordance with information 
asymmetries. 
ANALYSIS 
Data  
The sample consists of data relating to firms that are domiciled in Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. 
These are the European countries for which the full set of institutional indicators is 
available from the sources employed. The study treats the sample as representative of 
the European financial market, rather than different segmented economies, given the 
economic integration that has taken place during the last decade. 
The data sources are I/B/E/S for earnings forecasts for the current year and one 
and two years ahead and the corresponding number of shares for each firm, and 
Worldscope for market capitalisation and the information required to calculate the 
percentage of closely held shares13. Market capitalisation is required in order to 
calculate ex-dividend returns and to deflate earnings forecasts, which are specified for 
the purposes of this study on the entity basis rather than on the per share basis.14  
                                                 
 
 
13 The definition of closely held shares by Worldscope is as follows:  (1) shares held by officers, 
directors and their immediate families; (2) shares held in trust; (3) shares of the company held by any 
other corporation (except shares held in a fiduciary capacity by banks or other financial institutions); 
(4) shares held by pension/benefit plans; (5) shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more of the 
outstanding shares. 
14 Earnings forecasts are calculated by multiplying the I/B/E/S forecast per share by the number of 
shares in issue. This approach provides more readily for control over data equivalence, and avoids the 
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All firms included have a December year-end. Since the research is 
international, the focus on a particular date ensures that all observations are produced 
under similar market conditions, albeit in different locations. However, some firms 
draw up their accounts for a fiscal year other than the calendar year, which is a more 
prevalent practice in the UK than elsewhere. Although we are unaware of evidence 
that might suggest that there is any temporal bias in close of year analysts’ forecasts, 
we acknowledge that this is a potential source of concern when interpreting the 
results. 
Finally, in order to control for the influence of extreme values, observations 
falling at the top and bottom 1% of the frequency distribution were deleted. The 
fifteen-year period from 1988 to 2002 yielded 11,769 firm-year observations. 
Table 2 provides an overview of returns and expected earnings yields, by year 
and for the pooled sample. For the average European firm in the sample, the annual 
share price change was 9.07%, and earnings yield forecasts were 5.61% for the same 
period, 7.33% for the year ahead and 8.86% for two years ahead. Annual share price 
changes during this period were at their lowest on average amongst German firms, 
whose forecast earnings were also the lowest on average. Companies domiciled in 
Spain and the Netherlands recorded relatively high share price changes and earnings 
forecasts on average. It should be noted, however, that the standard deviations of 
annual returns and forecast earnings yield reported in Table 2 indicate that variability 
across firms is a particularly important characteristic of these data, regardless of 
corporate domicile. 
Empirical results  
The model has been estimated using a cross-sectional fixed year effects regression, 
where the panel structure of the data through time is accounted for in the estimation 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
problems that occur due to the disagreement between ‘per share’ adjustment factors in the different 
databases. 
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procedure. Year effects are considered appropriate to capture variation in earnings 
yield that could be attributed to changes in accounting conservatism and in the cost of 
capital across time. Indeed, changes in discount rates have been associated with more 
pronounced conservatism in the US by Ryan and Zarowin (2003).15 There is already 
evidence in the EU of an increase in earnings conservatism in the late 1990s (Raonic 
et al., 2004). In general, estimation of a cross-sectional time-series model with fixed 
effects is warranted by the high F-statistics reported in Table 3, Panel A. A random 
effects estimator would be inappropriate given the imbalance between groups. 
Panel B of Table 3 sets out the results from regression (11) for negative changes 
in the market value of equity. A reduction in the effect of bad news on forward 
earnings expectations is evident in the decrease in the magnitude of the slope 
coefficient α1 (0.0899) for the current year’s expected earnings with respect to the 
forecasts one and two years ahead (0.0784 and 0.0783), which is consistent with bad 
news being transient and likely to reverse in future periods. 
The evidence also shows, as predicted, that institutional arrangements have very 
little effect on solving the information asymmetry problem in widely-held firms. 
Insignificant coefficients are reported for α3 in jurisdictions that rely solely on strong 
investor protection law (α3 (1,0)), and in those where corporate governance 
arrangements are the predominant form of regulatory pressure (α3 (0,1)), and also when 
both types of institutional arrangement are in place (α3 (1,1) for current and one year 
ahead forecasts). 
On the other hand, as insiders become more prevalent, investor protection and 
monitoring are called upon to address the information asymmetry that arises. Indeed, 
the findings show that there is a strong association between increasing ownership 
concentration and less timely incorporation of bad news into forward earnings, as α4 
remains negative and significant across the forecaast horizon, not only in the current 
                                                 
 
 
15 Country differences in earnings forecast methods are difficult to assess as little is known with respect 
to the way in which analysts form their forecasts beyond stripping extraordinary items from earnings. 
Also, the earnings expectation employed is the consensus (median) forecast.   
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year (-0.0022) but also one year ahead (-0.0013) and two years ahead (-0.0012). This 
implies that, when the institutional constraints are limited, it is easier for insiders such 
as controlling shareholders and managers to conceal unfavourable information, to 
defer economic losses and to enjoy private control benefits. However, this negative 
effect is mitigated once we allow for the interaction between ownership concentration 
and either investor protection or monitoring. The absorption of bad news in earnings 
is more timely in those European jurisdictions with stronger investor protection (α6 
(1,0) is positive and significant across the forecast horizon: 0.0023>0.0012>0.0011) 
and in those with more clearly defined corporate governance structures (α6 (0,1) is also 
positive and significant across the forecast horizon: 0.0017>0.0014>0.0013). This 
suggests that stricter corporate governance practices can substitute for weaknesses in 
investor protection provision through the law. However, when strong investor 
protection and well defined monitoring mechanisms are both in place, there are no 
offsetting or incremental interaction effects. 
The evidence from Panel C of Table 3 shows that good news is revealed slowly 
and gradually in earnings forecasts, with α1 being plausibly zero in the current year 
but significantly positive one year and two years ahead and increasing in magnitude 
over time (0.0064<0.0152<0.0275). The differences in ownership concentration 
across firms do not seem to matter when it comes to the recognition of economic 
gains. The estimates of α4 are insignificant, as are those of α5 and α6 which confirm 
the arguments advanced here regarding the influence of investor protection and 
corporate governance mechanisms on timeliness. These results corroborate the initial 
motivation to focus attention on the timely revelation of bad news, which is based on 
the assumption that agency issues mainly arise from insiders concealing potential 
losses of value. 
CONCLUSION 
This study analyses the interactive influence of ownership concentration, legislation 
that protects outside investors and corporate governance mechanisms that require a 
clear separation between supervision and management on the recognition of good and 
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bad news in earnings forecasts. When investor protection is weak and corporate 
governance does not separate supervision from management, the findings show a 
systematic understatement in the recognition of bad news, evidence that can be 
interpreted as insiders (such as controlling shareholders and managers) concealing the 
effect of unfavourable information on current and short term earnings expectations. 
However, further analysis shows that effective investor protection legislation and well 
defined monitoring structures are able to offset these adverse effects of insider 
control. Also, our results suggest that corporate governance practices substitute for the 
lack of investor protection and vice versa. 
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Table 1 
Corporate Governance and Investor Protection 
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Corporate Governance            
1 Board structure (two tier vs. unitary) 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2 Separate supervisory and managerial leadership 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
                                                                          CG = 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Investor Protection            
1 Oppressed minority mechanism 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
2 % of share capital to place an item on agenda 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
3 Proxy by mail 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
4 Cumulative voting/Proportional representation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
                                                                           IP = 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Notes:  
The monitoring of management is scored on the basis of provisions in national corporate governance codes (European Commission,2002; Heidreck and Struggles,2001). A score of 1 is 
assigned if there is provision in the Code for a predominant two-tier board structure, or if there is a distinct separation between supervision and management. The summary indicator CG 
scores 1 if at least one of these mechanisms is present. The scoring of investors’ rights within the law is based on La Porta et al. (1998). A score of 1 is assigned if the law grants the right to 
minority shareholders to challenge the decisions of the management, or enables minority shareholders to call a meeting or place an item on the meeting agenda, or allows voting by mail, or 
provides for proportional representation when appointing directors to the board. The summary indicator IP scores 1 if at least one of these mechanisms is present. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
      Closely Held Shares (%)         Share Price Changes 
 
Number of 
Observations Mean 
Standard  
Deviation Median Mean 
Standard  
Deviation Median 
Belgium 493 52.31 17.63 53.11 0.0390 0.3806 0.0067 
Denmark 460 34.21 23.22 33.75 0.0960 0.4501 0.0209 
Finland 592 37.97 23.53 38.21 0.1505 0.5155 0.0576 
France 1971 51.30 22.94 53.28 0.1012 0.4453 0.0288 
Germany 1451 51.31 22.79 52.64 -0.0156 0.4510 -0.0643 
Italy 729 49.65 21.55 52.17 0.0599 0.4636 -0.0263 
Netherlands 1065 43.61 24.96 42.79 0.1159 0.4426 0.0547 
Norway 666 40.21 22.27 40.37 0.1095 0.5123 0.0567 
Spain 742 45.30 23.26 48.25 0.1266 0.4210 0.0858 
Sweden 1000 35.09 21.96 32.47 0.1048 0.5085 0.0465 
UK 2600 20.07 19.29 15.31 0.1145 0.4649 0.0482 
All Firms 11769 39.92 25.06 40.10 0.0907 0.4637 0.0280 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
                
             Current Forecast 
                          FY0 
              Earnings Yield 
     One Year Ahead Forecast 
                         FY1 
      
    Two Years Ahead Forecast 
                        FY2 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Median Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Median Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Median 
Belgium 0.0547 0.0445 0.0595 0.0704 0.0407 0.0691 0.0855 0.0478 0.0807 
Denmark 0.0580 0.0550 0.0570 0.0774 0.0480 0.0717 0.0918 0.0542 0.0850 
Finland 0.0574 0.0625 0.0535 0.0775 0.0559 0.0688 0.0969 0.0642 0.0855 
France 0.0520 0.0479 0.0530 0.0690 0.0428 0.0649 0.0829 0.0498 0.0771 
Germany 0.0339 0.0494 0.0369 0.0504 0.0392 0.0472 0.0644 0.0439 0.0578 
Italy 0.0433 0.0506 0.0419 0.0559 0.0447 0.0505 0.0702 0.0511 0.0610 
Netherlands 0.0781 0.0576 0.0809 0.0948 0.0516 0.0947 0.1103 0.0551 0.1091 
Norway 0.0606 0.0730 0.0626 0.0861 0.0575 0.0803 0.1047 0.0597 0.0983 
Spain 0.0708 0.0565 0.0699 0.0841 0.0481 0.0789 0.0980 0.0526 0.0921 
Sweden 0.0429 0.0609 0.0443 0.0621 0.0490 0.0552 0.0813 0.0561 0.0725 
UK 0.0656 0.0523 0.0673 0.0825 0.0459 0.0785 0.0969 0.0508 0.0900 
All Firms 0.0561 0.0559 0.0570 0.0733 0.0485 0.0691 0.0886 0.0539 0.0817 
Notes:  
Firm-year observations from 1988 to 2002 are for listed companies domiciled in European countries for which the full set of institutional 
indicators given in Table 1 is available. The information required to calculate the percentage of closely held shares is taken from Worldscope. 
The share price changes are ex-dividend returns based on Worldscope market capitalisation. To avoid problems arising from differences in 
‘per share’ adjustment factors in different databases, earnings forecasts are calculated on an entity basis by multiplying I/B/E/S consensus 
EPS (for the current year and one and two years ahead) by the corresponding number of shares in issue given by I/B/E/S, then scaled by the 
Worldscope market capitalisation of the entity. All firms in the sample have a December year-end, and observations falling at the top and 
bottom 1% of the frequency distribution have been deleted. 
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Table 3 
Panel A 
Insitutional Arrangements, Ownership and Value Shocks 
Cross-Sectional Time Series Fixed Effects Diagnostics 
 
    Negative Value Shocks     Positive Value Shocks 
 FY0 FY1 FY2 FY0 FY1 FY2 
Number of observations 5281 5281 5278 6049 6061 6071 
       
R2 goodness of fit       
  Within 15.03% 16.54% 12.74% 3.92% 8.01% 10.17% 
  Between 27.77% 34.59% 25.40% 20.19% 9.57% 3.14% 
  Overall 15.96% 17.10% 12.65% 3.87% 7.46% 9.23% 
       
Model F-test 58.03 65.01 47.88 15.35 32.82 42.76 
       
Observations per group       
  Minimum 8 8 8 32 32 32 
  Average 352.1 352.1 351.9 403.3 404.1 404.7 
  Maximum 864 863 863 859 861 859 
       
Standard deviation       
  Fixed error component 0.0120 0.0092 0.0100 0.0104 0.0100 0.011 
  Residual error component 0.0482 0.0371 0.0412 0.0502 0.0463 0.0520 
Fraction of variance due to fixed effect 5.86% 5.75% 5.57% 4.08% 4.47% 4.50% 
       
F-test of zero fixed error component 15.36 13.12 13.36 16.67 18.27 18.63 
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Table 3 
Panel B 
Insitutional Arrangements, Ownership and Negative Value Shocks 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7
i ,t n it k k k k it it it
k k it k k it it it it
FY R IPCG IPCG R R OC
IPCG OC IPCG R OC MC u
+ ′= α + α + α + α ∗ + α ∗
′ ′+ α ∗ + α ∗ ∗ + α +  
Panel A: Negative Value Shocks 
Coeff. IP CG Predicted sign  FY0 FY1 FY2 
α0    0.0612 0.0705 0.0831 
    (17.82) (26.67) (28.37) 
α1   (+) decreasing 0.0899*** 0.0784*** 0.0783*** 
    (7.87) (8.87) (8.02) 
α2   1 0  0.0112*** 0.0141*** 0.0125*** 
    (2.98) (4.87) (3.88) 
 0 1  0.0096*** 0.0142*** 0.0166*** 
    (2.37) (4.54) (4.79) 
  1 1  -0.0041 -0.0069 -0.0102*** 
    (-0.90) (-1.96) (-2.63) 
α3 1 0 (no effect) 0.0087 -0.0022 -0.0139 
    (0.71) (-0.23) (-1.31) 
 0 1 (no effect) 0.0241 0.0142 0.0117 
    (1.83) (1.40) (1.04) 
 1 1 (no effect)  0.0034 -0.0175 -0.0326*** 
    (0.24) (-1.64) (-2.75) 
α4   (-) -0.0022*** -0.0013*** -0.0012** 
    (-3.80) (-2.92) (-2.50) 
α5 1 0  0.0004** 0.0003** 0.0003 
    (2.10) (2.08) (1.96) 
 0 1  0.0003 0.0004*** 0.0004** 
    (1.71) (2.81) (2.42) 
 1 1  0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 
    (0.11) (0.67) (0.96) 
α6 1 0 (+) 0.0023*** 0.0012*** 0.0011** 
    (3.76) (2.66) (2.21) 
 0 1 (+) 0.0017*** 0.0014*** 0.0013** 
    (2.68) (2.90) (2.41) 
 1 1 (+) 0.0007 0.0008 0.0010 
    (1.12) (1.53) (1.83) 
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Table 3 
Panel C 
Insitutional Arrangements, Ownership and Positive Value Shocks 
 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7
i ,t n it k k k k it it it
k k it k k it it it it
FY R IPCG IPCG R R OC
IPCG OC IPCG R OC MC u
+ ′= α + α + α + α ∗ + α ∗
′ ′+ α ∗ + α ∗ ∗ + α +  
 
Panel B: Positive Value Shocks 
Coeff. IP CG Predicted sign  FY0 FY1 FY2 
α0    0.0581 0.0707 0.0833 
    (20.19) (26.62) (27.90) 
α1   (+)increasing 0.0064 0.0152*** 0.0275*** 
    (1.18) (3.04) (4.91) 
α2   1 0  0.0126*** 0.0124*** 0.0114*** 
    (4.01) (4.28) (3.5) 
 0 1  0.0156*** 0.0170*** 0.0175*** 
    (4.64) (5.48) (5.04) 
  1 1  -0.0066 -0.0055 -0.0068 
    (-1.62) (-1.47) (-1.63) 
 α3 1 0 (no effect) 0.0021 0.0075 0.0066 
    (0.36) (1.38) (1.09) 
 0 1 (no effect) 0.0011 0.0015 0.0026 
    (0.17) (0.27) (0.41) 
 1 1 (no effect) -0.0079 -0.0127 -0.0149 
    (-1.02) (-1.78) (-1.87) 
α4   (no effect) -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
    (-0.52) (-0.19) (-0.12) 
α5 1 0  -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 
    (-1.38) (-0.66) (-0.22) 
 0 1  0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
    (0.87) (1.40) (1.07) 
 1 1  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
    (-1.12) (-1.13) (-0.97) 
α6 1 0 (no effect) 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.74) (0.01) (-0.02) 
 0 1 (no effect) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.39) (0.08) (-0.06) 
 1 1 (no effect) 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 
    (0.60) (0.85) (0.47) 
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Notes: 
FYi,t+n is the expected earnings of the ith firm either for the current year (n=0), or for one year ahead 
(n=1), or two years ahead (n=2), scaled by market capitalisation at the beginning of the current year; Rit 
is the annual change in market capitalisation of the ith firm deflated by the market capitalisation at the 
beginning of the current year. CO ′  is the ownership effect that is exogenous to institutional 
arrangements. The intercept α0 is estimated when investor protection provisions (IP) and corporate 
governance arrangements (CG) are both absent, i.e. IPCGk = (0,0). The other levels of this factor are: 
(1,1) if the firm operates in an environment where strong investor protection is imposed by law and 
where managerial monitoring is also provided for in the local corporate governance code; (1,0) if there 
is strong investor protection but no monitoring; (0,1) if there is monitoring but investor protection is 
weak.  ** denotes statistical significance at 5% and *** at 1% or less. 
  
